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This paper analyses arbitration as a surrogate for complete contracts. We
embed this idea in a simple model of a long-term relationship between a firm
and its workforce, in which they can make productive-enhancing, relationship-
specific investments, and then negotiate over the division of the resultant sur-
plus. It is shown that the mere presence of the arbitrator (in the background
of negotiations) may enhance investment incentives ex-ante by minimising
each party’s ability to engage in hold-up behaviours ex-post. Furthermore, we
highlight notably that the partners should optimally commit to call an arbi-
trator ensuring a compromise by awarding a reasonable share of the surplus
to the worker. Indeed, this type of arbitrator would harmonise the parties’
bargaining powers and then weight their investment incentives optimally.
JEL classifications: D74, J52, K41.
‘. . . the role of the arbitrator is, in effect, to remember who sunk costs in the
past, and to ensure that future compensation is paid in a way that creates
the correct incentives to make such investments. It is important that he can
do this without infringing on the right to bargain, simply by threatening . . .
an arbitral settlement that leads bargainers to negotiate, for themselves, the
appropriate agreement.’ Vincent P. Crawford, The Role of Arbitration
and the Theory of Incentives, 1985.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. Arbitration can be defined by the presence of a third party
who is empowered to impose a binding settlement when parties fail to agree on
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one via bilateral negotiations. This mechanism is now widely used in developed
countries for most types of disputes, and its popularity may be explained by the
increasing caseload of public courts, a preference for confidentiality, and the desire
to reach agreements with minimal delay and minimal cost. For example, in labour
agreement, the costs of unresolved disputes may be dramatic, as when there is a
strike, or such costs may evolve more slowly as there is a steady erosion of morale
and productivity in the workplace. It is precisely for these reasons that arbitration
is currently used to settle wage disputes in the US public sector and is included in
many contracts as an alternative to litigation (Deck et al., 2007).1
In this paper, we argue that arbitration may also serve quite a different purpose,
namely, as a surrogate for complete contracts. It can act as a mechanism that
indirectly increases the incentives of parties in a long-term relationship to under-
take productivity-enhancing (but non contractible) relationship-specific investments.
Given the presence of transaction costs, it is optimal – in terms of promoting such
investments – to determine whether or not parties in a long-term relationship would
engage the services of an arbitrator (if they fail to resolve any disputes by them-
selves) at the outset of their relationship, well before undertaking such investments.
The basic argument that underlies this idea, which we develop in a simple model,
runs as follows. Whether or not disputes end-up being resolved by arbitration deter-
mines the parties’ respective outside options. This, in turn, affects their respective
bargaining powers over conflict situations encountered during their relationship, and
hence influences the distribution of the surplus. This then implies that it would in-
directly influence each party’s incentives to contribute to the generation of such
surplus ex-ante. In sum, the presence of an arbitrator in the background of negotia-
tions may have efficiency consequences (as well as having distributive consequences),
by mitigating the well-known hold-up problem.2 Indeed, arbitration may be viewed
as a mechanism able to protect each party’s investment against opportunism by his
partner (who could otherwise use the threat of disagreement to appropriate some of
the returns from the other party’s investment during the ex-post bargaining stage).
1.2. Arbitration Literature. This potential role of arbitration has been over-
looked in the literature, which essentially studies the allocative effects of arbitration
(i.e. the impact that arbitration may or may not have on the negotiated outcome).
1A key difference between the arbitration of disputes and their resolution in a court concerns the
nature of the fact-finder: both parties must agree to call in the arbitrator for the dispute to be
settled by him (Manzini and Mariotti, 2001).
2This problem has appeared in the economic literature under many different guises in a wide
variety of situations (Grout, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Tirole, 1999).
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The authors analyse mainly the strategic interactions that influence how bargainers
respond to arbitration, in order to study the effects of arbitration on negotiations
and/or the parties’ behaviour during the arbitration stage itself (Armstrong, 2004;
Deck and Farmer, 2009). Arbitration is then viewed as a process whose raison d’etre
is to enhance the likelihood of reaching an agreement. Indeed, it is commonplace in
this literature that negotiated agreements are to be preferred to the arbitral settle-
ments, and the extent to which an arbitration procedure encourages bargaining – by
promoting convergence between the disputants’ claims – is thus the main criterion
used in evaluating the existing procedures.
Following this criterion, final-offer arbitration (FOA) is generally considered as su-
perior to conventional arbitration (CA) as it induces disputants to make concessions
and submit closer bids. CA and FOA are the two most prevalent forms of arbitration
used in practice and perform as follows: CA mimics civil litigation in form since the
arbitrator listens to the two sides’ settlement proposals and is free to impose any
award of his choice, while FOA requires that each disputant proposes a final offer
and the arbitrator must choose one of the two (i.e. the one that is closest to his
own opinion of a fair settlement). The major criticism of CA in literature is that
arbitrators are inclined – or perceived – to compromise between the parties’ final po-
sitions, which encourages them to exaggerate claims and avoid concessions (Farber,
1981). To this respect, the proponents of FOA argue that this mechanism incites
disputants to stake out more reasonable positions since no compromise is possible
and the disputant with an extreme offer is likely to lose (Farber and Katz, 1979;
Farber, 1980; Armstrong and Hurley, 2002). However, it appears empirically that
arbitrators do much more than compromising, for example by referencing to some
exogenous notion of an equitable award (Bloom, 1986; Farber and Bazerman, 1986).
Furthermore, the fairly high frequency of negotiated settlements under FOA, which
is often presented in industrial relations literature as evidence of its success, may
indicate only that bargainers, while appearing to negotiate their own settlements,
have correctly perceived the arbitrator’s wishes and yielded to the incentives created
by FOA to conform to them (Crawford, 1981).3
1.3. Our Contribution. As mentioned above, the aim of our paper is to study the
link between arbitration and bargaining in another way, by considering that arbitra-
tion may have not only allocative effects but also efficiency consequences, essentially
in terms of promoting relationship-specific investments. This issue is analysed in a
3Aside from CA and FOA, some researchers have proposed alternative arbitration mechanisms
following a normative perspective (e.g. Zeng, 2003; Dickinson, 2004).
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simple model which contains several restrictive features and assumptions that have
been deliberately chosen to develop our main results and insights in a focused and
simplified manner.
To fix ideas, we consider the long-term relationship that invariably exists between
a firm and its workforce. The parties are contemplating undertaking relationship-
specific investments, which would increase the size of the aggregate surplus (revenue)
that they can generate from their relationship. Such investments may be of a wide
variety and manifold. For example, investments by the firm can be in a new pro-
ductive technology, while those by the workforce in productivity-enhancing work
practices. However, since these investments are typically non-contractible, the par-
ties will end up re-negotiating the terms of their relationship (that determines in
particular the division of the aggregate surplus between them) after such invest-
ments are undertaken and sunk, but before the returns can be generated, and then
consumed. The negotiations when conducted in the shadow of arbitration may gen-
erate an outcome which provides the parties with investment incentives that they
would not have otherwise. As such, the parties consider (before undertaking any
investments) whether or not to commit (via a costlessly enforceable contract) to
call an arbitrator in the eventuality that they fail to reach a negotiated agreement
by themselves, who would be empowered to impose a settlement. In order to get
more general results, we allow the parties the option to agree to rely on arbitra-
tion randomly and we determine, on this basis, the optimal probability with which
the arbitrator would be called (i.e. the optimal arbitration arrangement/regime) if
ex-post negotiations broke down. The optimal arbitration arrangement is the one
which provides the best investment incentives ex-ante and, hence, maximises the
ex-post social surplus. In a first result, we highlight that arbitration cannot fully
prevent the hold-up problem to occur since no party may be made residual claimant
of his investment at the bargaining stage. Consequently, each partner under-invests
relative to his first-best level of investment, regardless of the likelihood of arbitra-
tion. However, it is shown that the presence of the arbitrator (in the background
of negotiations) may be crucial in determining the magnitude of these distorsions.
The optimal regime is then the arbitration probability which minimises partners’
ability to engage in rent-seeking behaviours, by ensuring that their payoffs from dis-
agreement are equalised and, thus, their bargaining powers are harmonised (which
prevents them from making strategic use of their threat points in ex-post bargain-
ing). In this context, we show that some core parameters are particularly central to
the determination of this optimal regime. A first one is the share of the returns gen-
erated by the parties’ investments that the arbitrator will allocate to the worker in
case of disagreement. This parameter captures the “type” of the arbitrator and mea-
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sures the importance of the workforce in his preferences. In this context, our model
highlights that the parties should optimally commit to call an arbitrator ensuring
a compromise by awarding a reasonable share of the surplus to the worker. Indeed,
this type of arbitrator would maintain a balance in the parties’ bargaining powers
and then induce an optimal weight of their investment incentives. Furthermore, the
optimal regime depends also upon technological parameters which characterise the
productivities of parties’ investments. In this regard, it is notably emphasised that
the firm should be better protected – by weakening the likelihood of arbitration –
when its investment becomes relatively more productive. The objective to balance
the parties’ bargaining powers should then be relaxed by adjusting for the relative
productivities of their investments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays down our
model and derives some preliminary results. Section 3 analyses the main issue of
concern, namely, the optimal arbitration arrangement, and explores how it depends
on the core parameters of the framework. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. The Framework. Given past investments, we consider that the firm and its
workforce when working together in harmony and with full co-operation produce
one unit of output per worker. Furthermore, given the most recent wage agreement,
each worker’s wage rate is w, where w ∈ (0, 1). With this wage contract in place,
we consider the following strategic interaction between the parties.
At date 0, the firm and its workforce choose and commit to the probability pi with
which they would call upon the services of an arbitrator in the eventuality that they
fail to resolve any disputes by themselves in the future.
At date 1, given the choice made at date 0, the two parties consider whether or not to
make some further investments that would enhance productivity. If the firm invests
If and the workforce Iu, then the output per worker would increase by V (If , Iu),
provided, of course, that the two parties continue to work in harmony and with
full co-operation.4 It is assumed that V is concave, strictly increasing, and twice
continuously differentiable. These investments are sunk at this date. The cost to
player i (i = f, u) of investing I equals kI, where k > 0 is the common marginal
4Since these investments are non-contractible – because, for example, they cannot be verified
by third parties (such as the courts) – this necessarily implies that they will be chosen non-
cooperatively.
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cost of investment.5
At date 2, given the choices made at dates 0 and 1, the firm and its workforce engage
in wage re-negotiations. We adopt the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to describe
the outcome of these negotiations, in which the threat point is identified with the
parties’ payoffs from disagreement.6 If the parties strike a negotiated settlement on
wage w, then the firm’s payoff (per worker) is 1 + V (If , Iu) − w and each worker’s
payoff is w. However, it is possible that after the investments are undertaken and
sunk, the two parties do not continue to work in harmony and with full co-operation,
because they fail to strike a re-negotiated wage settlement. In that eventuality, one
of two things can happen, depending on whether or not an arbitrator is called to
impose a wage settlement.
If an arbitrator is not called (which happens with probability 1 − pi), then each
worker continues to receive the old wage rate, w, but in that case (for a variety
of reasons) not all (and possibly none) of the returns from the investments are
realised. We formalize and parameterize this possibility by assuming that only
a fraction λ of the additional surplus V (If , Iu) materializes in that case, where
λ ∈ [0, 1). The disagreement payoffs in the eventuality that an arbitrator is not
called are as follows: the firm’s payoff (per worker) is 1 + λV (If , Iu) − w and each
worker’s payoff is w. These payoffs capture the notion that the parties stick with the
existing wage contract, and consequently, disagreement entails that only a fraction
λ of the benefits from the investments are obtainable. This makes sense, since if the
parties do not reach an agreement on their own and have no arbitrator who would
impose a settlement, then disagreement entails some degree of inefficiency (as the
dispute remains unresolved and the parties do not work with full co-operation). The
parameter λ (i.e. the workforce resentment factor) captures the extent to which the
workforce refuses to cooperate with the firm if they end up working at the old wage
contract, implying that the workforce’s resentment is decreasing in λ.
If, on the other hand, an arbitrator is called (which happens with probability pi),
then he would be empowered to impose a wage settlement. We assume that the
arbitrator’s wage decision is
wA = w + αV (If , Iu), (1)
5For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the firm and its workforce have
an identical and constant marginal cost of investment. This assumption has been introduced for
algebraic convenience and could be relaxed without altering the gist of our arguments.
6See Muthoo (1999) for a discussion and analyses of the strategic (or non-cooperative) foundations
of the NBS, where, using various versions of Rubinstein’s alternating-offers model, he addresses
the questions of why, when and how to use this bargaining solution concept.
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where 0 < α < 1. It seems reasonable to consider that the wage given by the arbitra-
tor to each worker is the old wage rate plus some fraction of the additional surplus
V generated by the parties’ investments. The additional surplus could then be in-
terpreted as a mapping that defines the transformation of parties’ investments into
the arbitrator’s sentence when the parties fail to resolve the dispute by themselves.
In other words, the parameter α captures the type of the arbitrator and could be
viewed as a measure ot the importance of the workforce in the arbitrator’s prefer-
ences, implying that this importance is increasing in α. The disagreement payoffs
are then as follows: the firm’s payoff (per worker) is 1 + V (If , Iu) − wA, where wA
is defined in (1), and each worker’s payoff is wA. These payoffs capture the notion
that since the dispute is resolved by the arbitrator, the parties would subsequently
work in harmony and with full co-operation.
In consequence, the expected payoffs to the firm and each worker respectively from
disagreement are as follows:
df ≡ 1− w + [pi(1− α− λ) + λ]V (If , Iu) (2)
du ≡ w + piαV (If , Iu) . (3)
We would like to emphasise that although efficient bargaining implies that in equilib-
rium the parties will reach a negotiated settlement – and thus the arbitrator would
not be called upon – the size of the aggregate surplus depends on the equilibrium
investments made at date 1. The latter, it will be shown below, depend on the equi-
librium distribution of the surplus between the two parties, which, in turn, depends
on the parties’ relative bargaining powers that are in general influenced by their
respective expected disagreement payoffs (and hence by the probability with which
they have agreed at date 0 to call upon the arbitrator).
The core parameters of our model include the parameter α that captures the arbi-
trator’s preferences, the parameter λ that captures the extent of non-cooperation
when the workforce continues to work according to the old wage contract, and the
technological parameters as captured by the properties of the function V . Our main
objective is to study and develop the role and impact of these parameters on the
optimal arbitration arrangement (that is, the optimal value of pi). The optimal value
of pi is the one which maximises the net economic surplus and hence the equilibrium
incentives to invest.7
Before analysing this main question of interest, some comments on the framework
and its restrictive assumptions are in order. First, we assume that the firm and its
7pi could also be considered as an institutional choice variable that may be viewed as the availability
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as arbitration) in the society.
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workforce incur no cost in employing the arbitrator, which is obviously not consistent
with practice. However, this assumption is made to alleviate notations and without
loss of generality since our results on the efficiency consequences of arbitration would
carry over if the cost of employing the services of the arbitrator would comprise a
fixed cost. Indeed, the parties investment incentives are driven by their marginal
returns on investment, which are unaffected by fixed costs. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the introduction of such costs would have distributive implications – if these
costs are different between the parties – by altering the threat points and, hence,
the Nash-bargained utility payoffs. However, the analysis of such implications are
beyond the scope of our paper which is focused on efficiency considerations.
Second, by using the NBS, we implicitly rule out arbitrator’s intervention in equi-
librium since the parties will call upon an arbitrator only if they fail to reach a
negotiated settlement, which never happens: Pareto-efficiency property implies that
parties always reach an agreement since disagreement entails some degree of inef-
ficiency due to the potential workforce’s resentment. This restriction is somewhat
interesting since it enables us to highlight that the mere presence of the arbitra-
tor in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome and prevent
the parties from behaving opportunistically ex-post (thereby enhancing investment
incentives ex-ante). However, this framework is also puzzling since arbitration ob-
viously occurs in practice, and an extension to tackle this issue is thus proposed in
conclusion.
Third, following the literature on arbitration, we consider that the so-called “ar-
bitrator’s idea of a fair settlement” (i.e. α) is exogenously defined and captures
how the economic environment and arbitrator’s reasoning influence the arbitrated
outcome (see, e.g., Armstrong and Hurley, 2002). This assumption is made for sim-
plicity and could be relaxed by considering that α is endogenously chosen by this
third player. Such an extension is proposed in conclusion of the paper.
Finally, the parameter λ is also exogenous and this is naturally a restrictive assump-
tion. However, this parameter captures the extent to which the workforce refuses to
cooperate with the firm if they end up working at the old wage, and its value may be
exogenously determined by both behavioural and institutional factors. Indeed, fol-
lowing reciprocal motives, a worker who feels he has been mistreated by a firm may
engage in strike or acts of sabotage in order to punish the employer for being unfair.
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) provide an overview of the considerable evidence for such
reciprocity/fairness-based behaviours arising in different economic and social con-
texts (public good games, labour market interactions, ...). The authors emphasise
that the population is partly composed of such “reciprocal types”, which would be
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characterised by a low value of λ in our framework.8 However, as mentioned above,
this ability to retaliate may also be linked to institutional environment since it may
be correlated with laws on the right to strike or with the power of trade unions in
the jurisdiction concerned.
We now proceed to solve the above described three-stage dynamic game via the usual
backward induction procedure. We therefore begin by characterising the equilibrium
bargaining outcome at date 2, conditional on an arbitrary set of choices made at
dates 0 and 1.
2.2. Bargaining Outcome. As stated above, we use the – symmetric – NBS to
characterise the equilibrium bargaining outcome at date 2. Applying the NBS in
which the threat points are given by (2) and (3), simplifying and re-arranging terms,
it follows that the Nash-bargained utility payoffs to the firm and each worker are
respectively as follows:
uNf = 1− w + ΩfV (If , Iu) and uNu = w + ΩuV (If , Iu) , (4)
where
Ωf =
pi (1− λ− 2α) + (1 + λ)
2
and (5)
Ωu =
pi (2α + λ− 1) + (1− λ)
2
. (6)
These expressions can be interpreted in terms of partitions of the old and the ad-
ditional surpluses. The partition of the old surplus – which is one unit of output
per worker, and existed before any new investments were undertaken – is defined
by the old wage contract in which each worker receives w units of the surplus, and
the firm obtains the remainder. The additional surplus, which is V (If , Iu) units of
output per worker, is split in such a way that party i gets a fraction Ωi of it (with
Ωf + Ωu = 1). Notice that the influence of pi on the party i’s bargaining power,
captured by Ωi, depends on the type of the arbitrator (captured by the parameter
α) and the workforce resentment factor (determined by the value of λ).
2.3. Equilibrium Investments. Having characterised the outcome of the nego-
tiations at date 2 over the partition of the aggregate surplus (for an arbitrary set
8These behavioural considerations justify that the worker does not express feelings of resentment
towards the employer in case of arbitration. Indeed, his wage does not remain at its old value in
this case and the worker may be grateful to the employer for his ex-ante commitment to call an
arbitrator in case of bargaining failure ex-post.
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of choices made at dates 0 and 1), we now determine the equilibrium investment
levels chosen by the parties at date 1. However, we first characterise the first-best
investment levels.
The first-best (or Pareto-efficient) investment levels Ief and I
e
u maximise the differ-
ence between the aggregate surplus and the total cost of the investments, V (If , Iu)−
k(If + Iu). As such I
e
f and I
e
u are the unique solutions to the following first-order
conditions:
V1(If , Iu) = k and V2(If , Iu) = k, (7)
where V1 and V2 respectively denote the first-order derivatives of V with respect
to its first and second arguments. They respectively define the aggregate marginal
benefits of the firm’s and the workforce’s investments. Efficiency requires that such
marginal returns be equated to the corresponding marginal costs.
We now characterise the Nash equilibrium investment choices made at date 1. Given
an arbitrary value of pi, the equilibrium investment levels, denoted by I∗f and I
∗
u,
comprise the unique solution to the following first-order conditions:
ΩfV1 (If , Iu) = k and ΩuV2 (If , Iu) = k (8)
The left-hand sides of these expressions are respectively the parties’ private marginal
benefits from their respective investments, which are strictly less than the corre-
sponding aggregate marginal benefits from such investments (given that Ωi < 1).
This observation immediately implies that the players’ Nash equilibrium investment
levels are below their corresponding first-best levels, whatever the arbitration ar-
rangement (i.e. for any pi ∈ [0, 1]). This under-investment result is essentially due
to the fact that whatever the arbitration terms a player receives less than the full
marginal benefit of his investment.
Proposition 1 Whatever is the arbitration arrangement, each party under-invests
relative to his first-best level of investment.
This result arises because after undertaking and sinking his investment, each party
is held-up by the other party. It is precisely because of this problem that it makes
economic sense for parties to commit ex-ante – well before any investments are
undertaken – on the probability with which they would call upon the arbitrator.
Indeed, since I∗f and I
∗
u depend on pi, it is clear that pi will be crucial in determining
the size and direction of the investment distortions. In other words, different values
of pi will induce different equilibrium investment levels, and hence different levels of
the net economic surplus. The optimal arbitration arrangement (i.e. the optimal
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value of pi) is the one which minimises the distortions of the productivity-enhancing,
relationship-specific investments from their first-best levels. We now turn to address
this main issue.
3. Optimal Arbitration
Moving backwards to date 0, we now turn attention to the main issue of concern,
namely, the study of the determination of the optimal value of pi. The optimal pi is
one that maximises the equilibrium net surplus S(I∗f , I
∗
u), where S(., .) is defined as
follows
S (If , Iu) ≡ 1 + V (If , Iu)− k (If + Iu) (9)
The equilibrium net surplus depends on the value of pi indirectly, via its influence on
the equilibrium investment levels. We write it as S∗ (pi). So, the optimal arbitration
arrangement, denoted by pi∗, is the value of pi over the interval [0, 1] that maximises
S∗ (pi) and thus provides the partners with the best investment incentives. As noted
above, it is clear that the optimal pi will provide relatively higher equilibrium surplus,
and relatively smaller distortions of the equilibrium investment levels from their
respective first-best levels. If pi∗ = 1 then the firm and its workforce should optimally
contract to call an arbitrator in the eventuality that they fail to reach a negotiated
settlement, while if pi∗ = 0 then it is optimal for the parties to resolve their dispute
without the presence of the arbitrator. If instead 0 < pi∗ < 1 then it is optimal for
the partners to call upon the arbitrator with probability pi∗. The following result is
useful in developing our subsequent analysis of optimal arbitration arrangement.
Lemma 1 Define ∆ = (2α + λ− 1)/2. For any pi ∈ [0, 1],
If ∆ > 0, then
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ V22 (Ωu)4 − V11 (Ωf )4 T 0, (10)
If ∆ < 0, then
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ V11 (Ωf )4 − V22 (Ωu)4 T 0, (11)
where V11 and V22 are evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Without imposing any further restrictions on the function V , it is evident from
Lemma 1 that not much can be said about pi∗. In what follows, therefore, we
derive a number of results about pi∗ in the context of some additional parametric
restrictions on V . We begin with the case in which V11 and V22 are identical, and
equal some strictly negative constant, but we do not impose any restriction on the
sign of V12.
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Proposition 2 Assume that V11 and V22 are identical. Define
α =
1− λ
2
and α =
1
2
.
(a) If either λ = 0, or λ > 0 and α < α, then the optimal rule is pi∗ = 0.
(b) If λ > 0 and α < α ≤ α, then the optimal rule is pi∗ = 1.
(c) Otherwise (i.e. if λ > 0 and α > α), then the firm and its workforce should
optimally contract to call an arbitrator with probability pi∗, where
pi∗ =
λ
2α + λ− 1 . (12)
Proof. See Appendix 2
While the hypothesis of this proposition restricts the class of applicable functions V
(e.g. some subclass of the quadratic family), its implications are powerful, as they
reappear in the context of a larger class of utility functions (see below) and offer a
significant benchmark. This result says that the workforce resentment factor (i.e. λ)
and the arbitrator’s type (i.e. α) determine the optimal contractual arrangement.
The optimal value pi∗ from Proposition 2(c) is the unique value of pi such that Ωf =
Ωu = 1/2. In other words, it is the unique arbitration arrangement that ensures that
the parties’ payoffs from disagreement are equalised, that the power relations within
work are harmonised, and that the net surplus is split equally. This balancing out
of bargaining powers is relevant, especially in relation to the provision of investment
incentives to the two parties. Indeed, the players cannot make strategic use of
their threat points in bargaining situations they encounter throughout their labour
relationships. Both parties are thus willing to invest optimally because neither fears
expropriation by the other partner. Thus, the optimal arbitration arrangement
design a particular game between the partners, one in which the ability of individuals
to engage in rent-seeking behaviour is minimised.
In summary, the terms of the optimal arbitration agreement prevent the parties
from behaving opportunistically ex-post, thereby promoting efficient second-best
investments ex-ante. Of course, the partners’ equilibrium investments may differ as
they also depend on the structure of the function V . Turning to the optimal value
of pi itself, equation (12) highlights that it is increasing in λ. This implies that the
more the firm is able to capture the benefits from the investments when the parties
fail to reach an agreement (i.e. the higher is the value of λ), the larger should be
the probability with which the partners would call upon the arbitrator. Although
unappealing at first, this relationship is consistent with the idea that a key force
underlying the determination of the optimal contractual arrangement concerns the
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tendency to equalise players’ bargaining powers. In other words, an increase in
λ, which increases the firm’s bargaining power, should be (partially) offset by an
increase in pi.9
In this context, it is straightforward to interpret the other parts of Proposition
2 and the role played by the parameter α in determining the optimal arbitration
arrangement. Considering that α < α < α, the result stated in Proposition 2(b)
shows that it is optimal to call upon the arbitrator (pi∗ = 1). This is because this
kind of arbitrator, by choosing a reasonable sentence (i.e. an intermediate value
of α), would help induce an optimal compromise in the provision of investment
incentives to the parties. Following Proposition 2(a), the same logic holds if α < α
since, in this case, the presence of the arbitrator decreases sharply the worker’s
bargaining power and does not maintain a balance in the provision of investment
incentives between the two parties, which implies that the optimal behaviour is not
to call the arbitrator (pi∗ = 0).
We now examine another widely used class of functions of the Cobb-Douglas type,
namely V = (If )
ηf (Iu)
ηu , where 0 < ηi < 1 and ηf + ηu < 1. These functions
are smooth, strictly increasing in each of their two arguments, and strictly concave.
Furthermore, since V12 > 0, the investments are complements. The parameters ηf
and ηu capture the parties’ productivities and the ratio ηi/ηj (i 6= j) is therefore a
measure of productive heterogeneity between the two players. Our main objective is
to analyse the impact of these parameters (as well as the impact of the arbitrator’s
preferences and the workforce resentment factor) on determination of the optimal
arbitration arrangement. Our main results are summarised in the following.
Proposition 3 Assume that V = (If )
ηf (Iu)
ηu, where 0 < ηf < 1, 0 < ηu < 1 and
ηf + ηu < 1. Define
α =
1− λ
2
, α =
θ
1 + θ
, and λ˜ =
1− θ
1 + θ
,
where θ =
√
ηu (1− ηf )
ηf (1− ηu) .
(a) If λ ≤ λ˜, then the optimal rule is pi∗ = 0.
(b) If λ > λ˜ and α < α ≤ α, then the optimal rule is pi∗ = 1.
(c) Otherwise (i.e. if λ > λ˜ and α > α), then the firm and its workforce should
9Furthermore, notice that the value of λ determines the threshold α as well as the equilibrium
contractual arrangement pi∗: we can notice that α′ (λ) < 0 which implies that an increase in λ
induces the probability that pi∗ = 1 to be more likely (following the idea mentioned above).
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optimally contract to call an arbitrator with probability pi∗ where
pi∗ =
λ
2α + λ− 1 −
(1− θ)
(1 + θ) (2α + λ− 1) . (13)
Proof. See Appendix 3
We know that as far as the objective to balance the bargaining strengths of the
parties is concerned, the first term in (13) rules out opportunistic expropriation by
either party by offsetting the players’ bargaining powers. Consider the case in which
ηf = ηu, that is, the function V is symmetric in partners’ investments. Proposition
3(c) implies that the optimal contractual arrangement is identical to the arrangement
identified in Proposition 2. Indeed, if ηf = ηu, then θ = 1 and the second term in
pi∗ disappears. The earlier discussion on Proposition 2 therefore applies to this case
as well, even though the third partial derivatives of V here are not zero.
Turning to the case of productive heterogeneity between the players, now consider
the case in which ηf 6= ηu. The second term in (13) relaxes the objective to harmonise
the parties’ ex-ante bargaining powers by adjusting for the relative importance of
the investments. To see this, substitute the optimal value pi∗ from Proposition 3(c)
into (5) and (6) to obtain
Ω∗f =
1
1 + θ
and Ω∗u =
θ
1 + θ
,
which implies that
ηf > ηu (hence θ < 1)⇔ Ω∗f > Ω∗u,
ηf < ηu (hence θ > 1)⇔ Ω∗f < Ω∗u.
The intuition for this follows from the fact that when party i’s investment is more
productive than j’s, then the second term of the optimal value pi∗ translates into
a greater bargaining strength of i compared to j, which he will use to obtain a larger
share of the economic surplus. Therefore, the comparative importance/productivities
of the two parties for the generation of the returns is a key force determining the op-
timal arbitration arrangement. If the firm’s investment is more productive than the
workforce’s investment (i.e. ηf > ηu), then the firm’s share of the additional surplus
V generated from the two parties’ investments increases ceteris paribus. This will
cause the firm’s investment incentives to increase, and the workforce’s incentives to
decrease, so that I∗f > I
∗
u. The opposite is true if ηf < ηu. Ultimately the optimal
value pi∗ from Proposition 3(c) ensures – by weighting the marginal returns to in-
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vesting of both partners and balancing out their bargaining powers – that the sum
of their contributions, and thus economic surplus, is maximised. Indeed, conducting
a comparative statics analysis on pi∗, it is straightforward to show that the optimal
probability of arbitration is decreasing in ηf (i.e. ∂pi
∗/∂ηf < 0), which emphasises
that the firm should be better protected – by lessening the likelihood of arbitration
– when its investment becomes more productive.
The analysis in this section does not offer a general characterisation of the opti-
mal arbitration terms when both parties can invest and a stochastic contract is
possible. Additional research on this issue remains to be done. However, in spite
of the specific parametrizations of V , a main insight of Propositions 2-3 is worth
emphasising.10 In equilibrium, three components matter in determining the opti-
mal contractual arrangement (which is designed so as to balance out the bargaining
powers of both parties and their investment incentives). The first is given by the
arbitrator-preference parameter (i.e. α) that captures the type of the arbitrator.
The second element is the workforce resentment factor (i.e. λ) that captures the
extent of non-cooperation when the workforce continues to work according to the old
wage contract. The third component is represented by the technological parameters
(i.e. ηf and ηu) that capture the productivities of each partner’s relationship-specific
investment. In this perspective, giving a larger share of V to the party whose invest-
ment is relatively more important than the other party’s investment is consistent
with the aim of endowing this player with greater bargaining power and thus induc-
ing him to provide the optimal level of investment. Indeed, the party i’s relative
bargaining power determines i’s marginal returns on his investment, which, in turn,
determines his marginal incentives.
4. Concluding Remarks
Arbitration can matter. Its presence (in the background) may have not only distribu-
tive but also efficiency consequences within long-term relationships, by influencing
each partner’s incentives to undertake productivity-enhancing, relationship-specific
investments. As such, the optimal terms of arbitration — whether or not to institute
it, and if so, what type — need to be based, if not wholly, at least substantially on
these observations. In this paper, we have formally explored this issue from this per-
spective. We show that the optimal arbitration arrangement depends on various key
variables including the arbitrator’ preferences, the parties’ bargaining powers, and
10We could finally consider a simple parametric case in which investments are independent (V12 =
0), by assuming for example that V (If , Iu) = ηfI
β
f + ηuI
β
u where 0 < β < 1. However, the results
for this case would be identical to those identified in Proposition 2.
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the comparative parties’ productivities in generating the returns from their invest-
ments. A fundamental principle that governs the optimal arbitration arrangement
is to equalise the parties’ economic positions within work (thereby balancing out
parties’ bargaining powers within their relationship) and to weight their investment
incentives. Hence, by giving backing to the wage re-negotiation process, the terms
of the arbitration arrangement prevent parties behaving opportunistically ex-post,
thereby promoting efficient investments ex-ante.
As noted in Introduction, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that ap-
plies the incomplete contracts approach to the study of arbitration. The incomplete
contracts approach is powerful because it is based on the premiss that transac-
tion costs plague human interaction, and the consequent potent observation that
property rights have efficiency consequences, which, of course, means that Coase’s
Theorem fails to apply. However, we have only just scratched the surface of the
various matters than impinge on this issue. Much more work needs to be done to
improve our understanding of the efficiency implications of arbitration.
In this context, several extensions and generalisations suggest themselves. First, a
simplifying but somewhat restrictive assumption that underlies the model is that
disagreement (and arbitrator’s intervention) is ruled out in equilibrium. Although
many of our main qualitative insights would be robust to allowing arbitration to
occur with positive probability, it would be useful to formally address this issue
partly because if the likelihood of dispute is real then the parties’ incentives would
be altered from our current analysis. A natural way to make disagreement possible
in equilibrium would be to introduce asymmetric information in the present setup.
Second, the above analysis concerns the optimal arbitration arrangement that, once
in place, will maximise the social surplus. This approach should be interpreted
by considering that pi is chosen by the regulator to provide the parties with the
best investment incentives. From a practical perspective, following the arguments
exposed in note 7, the value of pi∗ may capture the actions taken by public authorities
in order to promote the use of arbitration as an alternative to standard litigation.
For example, it is well-known that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are
widely used in the US, while it less common in France, and it can be related to
institutional choices. The weakness of this idea is that it is silent on the question
of whether, or under what circumstances, will the parties agree in equilibrium to
commit to call the arbitrator (in the eventuality that they fail to reach a negotiated
settlement). Therefore, It would be interesting to consider that the parties have the
opportunity to negotiate a (legally enforceable) contract governing the arbitration
terms.
Third, an alternative approach could involve to endogenise the arbitrator’s behaviour
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by considering that the parameter α is chosen to maximise the equilibrium aggregate
surplus. The idea behind this story would be to analyse how the arbitrator’s award
might shape investment incentives, and to determine what is the optimal award
on this basis, depending on some crucial technological and institutional parameters
(i.e. λ, pi, ηf and ηu). In other words, the aim of this alternative model would be
to emphasise how the arbitrator should make one party prevailing over the other
one – by choosing the value of α – in order to enhance the efficiency of the labour
relationship.11
Finally, a further step towards realism would be also to embed the present framework
within a dynamic game in which parties (and arbitrator) interact repeatedly over
time, learn about their investments, and build up some trust.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank two anonymous referees and the Editor for their useful comments.
References
Armstrong, M.J. (2004), “A Comparison of Arbitration Procedures for Risk-
Averse Disputants,” Decision Sciences, 35, 639-664.
Armstrong, M.J. and Hurley W.J. (2002), “Arbitration Using the Closest
Offer Principle of Arbitrator behaviour,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 43, 19-26.
Bloom, D.E. (1986), “Empirical Models of Arbitrator behaviour under Conven-
tional Arbitration,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 68, 578-585.
Crawford, V.P. (1981), “Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-
Management Bargaining,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
71, 205-210.
Crawford, V.P. (1985), “The Role of Arbitration and the Theory of Incentives,”
in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining edited by A. Roth, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Deck, C.A. and Farmer A. (2009), “Strategic Bidding and Investments in Final-
Offer Arbitration: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic be-
haviour & Organization, 70, 361-373.
11In this framework, the parameter pi would be exogenously defined.
17
Deck, C., Farmer, A., and Zeng D-Z. (2007), “Amended Final-Offer Arbitra-
tion over an Uncertain Value: A Comparison with CA and FOA,” Experimental
Economics, 10, 439-454.
Dickinson, D.L. (2004), “A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Offer, and “Com-
bined” Arbitration for Dispute Resolution,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
57, 288-301.
Farber, H.S. (1980), “An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 24, 683-705.
Farber, H.S. (1981), “Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration,” Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 35, 70-77.
Farber, H. and Bazerman M.H. (1986), “The General Basis of Arbitrator
behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration,”
Econometrica, 54, 1503-1528.
Farber, H.S. and Katz H.C. (1979), “Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the
Incentives to Bargain,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33, 55-63.
Fehr, E. and Ga¨chter S. (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 14, 159-181.
Grossman, S. and Hart O. (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94,
42-64.
Grout, P. (1984), “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts:
A Nash Bargaining Approach,” Econometrica, 52, 449-460.
Hart, O.D. and Moore S.J. (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.
Manzini, P. and Mariotti M. (2001), “Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bar-
gaining with Arbitration,” Games and Economic behaviour, 37, 170-195.
Muthoo, A. (1999), Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Tirole, J. (1999), “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand ?,” Econometrica,
67, 741-781.
Zeng, D-Z. (2003), “An Amendment to Final-Offer Arbitration,” Mathematical
Social Sciences, 46, 9-19.
18
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiating S∗ with respect to pi, we obtain that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
= V1
∂I∗f
∂pi
+ V2
∂I∗u
∂pi
− k
(
∂I∗f
∂pi
+
∂I∗u
∂pi
)
Since, by (5) and (6), Ωf + Ωu = 1, it follows using (8) that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
= ΩuV1
∂I∗f
∂pi
+ ΩfV2
∂I∗u
∂pi
(14)
Differentiating the first-order conditions in (8) with respect to pi, we find that
∂I∗f
∂pi
=
∆
Σ
(
V2V12
Ωu
+
V1V22
Ωf
)
, (15)
∂I∗u
∂pi
= −∆
Σ
(
V1V12
Ωf
+
V2V11
Ωu
)
, (16)
where ∆ = (2α + λ − 1)/2 and Σ = V11V22 − (V12)2, with all the first-order and
second-order partial derivatives evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels I∗f
and I∗u.
After substituting for the derivatives of the equilibrium investments (using (15) and
(16)) into the right-hand side of (14), simplifying, re-arranging terms, and finally
using the first-order conditions in (8) to substitute for V1 and V2, we obtain that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
=
k∆
Σ (ΩfΩu)
3
[
V22 (Ωu)
4 − V11 (Ωf )4
]
.
The Lemma follows immediately since k > 0, Σ > 0, Ωf > 0, and Ωu > 0 
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. Consider first the case where ∆ > 0. Under the (additional) hypothesis of
this proposition, it follows from Lemma 1 that for any pi ∈ [0, 1],
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ Ωf − Ωu T 0.
Then, using (5) and (6), we obtain that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ ρ (pi) T 0, where ρ := pi (1− λ− 2α) + λ.
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We then note that
ρ (pi) T 0⇔ pi∗ T pi,
where pi∗ is stated in (12).
Hence, since λ ∈ [0, 1), it follows that pi∗ ≮ 0 and we obtain
pi∗ ≥ 0⇔ λ ≥ 0 and pi∗ T 1⇔ α S α, (17)
where α is stated in Proposition 2.
This implies that, when ∆ > 0, pi∗ is the unique stationary (or turning) point of the
function S∗.
Step 2. Consider now the case where ∆ < 0. It follows from Lemma 1 that for any
pi ∈ [0, 1],
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ Ωu − Ωf T 0.
Then, using (5) and (6), we obtain that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ ϕ (pi) T 0, where ϕ := pi (2α + λ− 1)− λ.
However, since ∆ < 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1), it is straightforward to show that ϕ (pi) < 0
which implies the following result:
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
< 0 for any pi ∈ [0, 1] . (18)
Proposition 2 follows immediately from the above results (in (17 ) and (18)) and
the fact that ∆ T 0⇔ α T α, where α is stated in Proposition 2 
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 3
For simplicity, we assume that ∆ > 0 (i.e. α > α, where α is stated in this Propo-
sition). This assumption has been introduced in order to develop understanding
about the role of the factors under study in a sharper manner and could be easily
relaxed without altering the gist of our arguments.
From the first-order conditions in (8), we obtain the following relationship between
the equilibrium investment levels:
I∗f =
(
Ωfηf
Ωuηu
)
I∗u.
It follows from an application of Lemma 1 – after substituting for the equilibrium
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values of V11 and V22, using the above relationship between the equilibrium invest-
ment levels, and finally substituting for Ωf and Ωu – that
∂S∗ (pi)
∂pi
T 0⇔ ψ (pi) S 0,
where ψ :=
(
1− θ
2
)
+
(
1 + θ
2
)
[pi (2α− 1)− λ (1− pi)] .
We then note that
ψ (pi) T 0⇔ pi T pi∗,
where pi∗ is stated in (13). This implies that pi∗ is the unique stationary (turning)
point of the function S∗. Proposition 3 follows immediately from the above results,
the assumption that ∆ > 0, and the following two results:
pi∗ T 0⇔ λ T λ˜ and pi∗ T 1⇔ α S α,
where λ˜ and α are stated in the Proposition 
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